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ABSTRACT  
   
Today the information technology systems have addresses, software stacks and 
other configuration remaining unchanged for a long period of time. This paves way for 
malicious attacks in the system from unknown vulnerabilities. The attacker can take 
advantage of this situation and plan their attacks with sufficient time. To protect our system 
from this threat, Moving Target Defense is required where the attack surface is dynamically 
changed, making it difficult to strike.  
In this thesis, I incorporate live migration of Docker container using CRIU 
(checkpoint restore) for moving target defense. There are 460K Dockerized applications, a 
3100% growth over 2 years[1]. Over 4 billion containers have been pulled so far from 
Docker hub. Docker is supported by a large and fast growing community of contributors 
and users. As an example, there are 125K Docker Meetup members worldwide. As we see 
industry adapting to Docker rapidly, a moving target defense solution involving containers 
is beneficial for being robust and fast. A proof of concept implementation is included for 
studying performance attributes of Docker migration. 
The detection of attack is using a scenario involving definitions of normal events 
on servers. By defining system activities, and extracting syslog in centralized server, attack 
can be detected via extracting abnormal activates and this detection can be a trigger for the 
Docker migration.   
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION  
Live migration has been a topic of interest for mostly reasons like load balancing, 
maintenance of systems. It has been also introduced for security in moving target defense 
scene in dynamic network category. As the industry is rapidly adapting to Docker for 
applications, in this thesis I introduced Docker migration as a part of moving target defense. 
Docker containers have different file structure than virtual machines. They are much lighter 
and hence will provide a lesser downtime compared to virtual machine migration.  
I will also discuss performance metrics for every step in the migration of the containers.  
The detection of attack in done by event tracing. I am defining system information in audit 
policy which will identify which traffic is abnormal vs normal. The logs are collected at a 
centralized server using rsyslog configuration. Once combined, all the abnormal behavior 
gives a time line of events that are threatful and contribute towards much higher impactful 
attack.  
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND 
Moving Target Defense  
Today information technology systems have addresses, software stacks and other 
configurations remaining unchanged for a long period of time. This paves way for 
malicious attacks in the system from unknown vulnerabilities. The attacker can take 
advantage of this situation and plan their attacks with sufficient time. To protect our 
systems from this threat, Moving Target Defense project is introduced where attack surface 
is dynamically changed making it difficult to be strike. 
US Department of Homeland Security defines Moving Target Defense as “Moving Target 
Defense (MTD) is the concept of controlling change across multiple system dimensions in 
order to increase uncertainty and apparent complexity for attackers, reduce their window 
of opportunity and increase the costs of their probing and attack efforts. MTD assumes that 
perfect security is unattainable” [2] 
The techniques of moving target defense depends on which static configurations like 
addresses, names, software stacks, networks are changed over time. In this section, I will 
be discussing the majority of them. 
The Moving Target Defense techniques can be broadly classified into the types as shown 
in the Table 1  
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Table 1 : Techniques in Moving Target Defense[3] 
Type Description 
Dynamic Runtime Environment Techniques that change the environment 
presented to an application by the 
operating system (OS) during execution 
dynamically. 
Dynamic Software Techniques that change application’s code 
dynamically. The change can include 
modifying the program instructions, their 
order, their grouping, and their format. 
Dynamic Data Techniques that change the format, 
syntax, encoding, or representation of 
application 
data dynamically 
Dynamic Platforms Techniques that change platform 
properties (e.g., central processing unit 
(CPU), OS) dynamically. This can include 
the OS version, CPU architecture, OS 
instance, platform data format, etc. 
Dynamic Networks Techniques that change network 
properties including protocols or 
addresses dynamically 
 
Docker 
Docker is an extension of Linux Containers (LXC). It is a unique kind of lightweight, 
application-centric virtualization that drastically reduces overhead and makes it easier to 
deploy software on servers. Docker allows a developer to package up an application with 
all of the parts it needs, such as libraries and other dependencies, and ship it all out as one 
package. It eliminates the problem of “works on my system”.  
In order to understand difference between Virtual Machines and Docker we need to know 
that virtual machines (VMs) are an abstraction of physical hardware turning one server 
into many servers. The hypervisor allows multiple VMs to run on a single machine. Each 
VM includes a full copy of an operating system, one or more apps, necessary binaries and 
libraries - taking up tens of GBs. VMs can also be slow to boot taking upto 2-3 minutes 
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depending on their configuration. Containers are an abstraction at the application layer 
that packages code and dependencies together. Multiple containers can run on the same 
machine and share the OS kernel with other containers, each running as isolated 
processes in user space. Containers take up less space than VMs (container images are 
typically tens of MBs in size), and start almost instantly.On same hardware investment , 
we can have more containers than VMs .  
On the security front, Docker depends on the security of the host machine. If there are 
inherent vulnerabilities in the host machine, then docker can get vulnerable to attacks. 
 
Checkpoint Restore in User Space  
Check point restore in user space is an open source project created by Pavel Emelyanov 
[17]. It was created with the goal of live migration of containers. It implements the 
checkpoint/restore functionality in the user space. This helped me to build the proof of 
concept of performing live migration for Moving Target Defense, It freezes an running 
application as a collection of files on disk in form of images. These images are used to 
restore the application from checkpoint state on any host that has similar configuration of 
docker containers.  
 
Related Work 
The following literature review shows the recent advances in the field of Moving Target 
Defense. 
Carvalho, Marco, and Richard Ford. “Moving-target defenses for computer networks.” 
(IEEE Security & Privacy 2 (2014): 73-76) [4] showed brief overview of Moving Target 
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Defense and its potential application to computer network security. In traditional system, 
due to static network architecture, attackers have infinite amount of time to learn about the 
infrastructure and its potential vulnerabilities to achieve their goals. This gives attackers an 
unfair advantage compared to defenders. In such cases defense is mainly reactive and no 
proactive. This is state of the art in network defense. Learning from attacks and updating 
systems can increase the cost of infrastructure and still be vulnerable. New techniques are 
explored to mitigate the effort and cost asymmetry between attackers and defenders. 
Moving target defense does not focus on shielding but on manipulation and control of 
targets.  
MTD could choose various ways of defense. One of them is to periodically change part of 
OS to change a critical service It could restructure a software defined network’s topology 
by changing address space to defend against brute force. MTD is proactive and works 
without feedback. It can adapt at a slower pace than reactive defense as it increases network 
complexity. Reactive MTD can make changes in system when they receive trigger from a 
security sensor. Mostly MTD system use adaptive response which takes sensors triggers 
and events to change their behavior and hence moving between proactive states. One of the 
most citied example of MTD based on use of ASLR, that randomly arranges address space 
to make it difficult to exploit.  
Using MTD resilience systems can be built that are able to detect and recover from security 
events and develop ways to evade these attacks. Moving target defense can increase system 
complexity from a defensive angle. Enabling a system to move and adapt for defense that 
makes it difficult to track and maintain. Intelligent attackers can also adapt and completely 
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change their operating procedures to attack the defense model. Attacker- defender co-
evolution is thus an important challenge.  
Evans, David, Anh Nguyen-Tuong, and John Knight. “Effectiveness of moving target 
defenses.” Moving Target Defense. Springer New York, 2011. 29-48 [5] described in their 
paper the diversification of the semantics of the lower level program. Though the advantage 
is that it can be done automatically independent of behavioral specification, the limitation 
is that these diversification is that they can change behavior only for exploits of undefined 
semantics. Therefore the system can be still affected by application level attacks and is 
immune from the code injection and memory corruption attacks. The other type of diversity 
alters at application level. This highly depends on the clear understanding of the 
application’s behavior and ensure that defense from attack is possible without 
compromising the functionality. This leads to high manual load to produce variants. The 
paper describes three common types of automatic diversity techniques to disrupt exploits.  
Address space randomization to randomize the location of objects in memory so that 
attacks that exploit the information of the address fail. Instruction set randomization is 
technique for thwarting code injection attacks by obscuring instruction set of target. 
Attacks will not be possible if a code is being injected into target application without 
knowing the target’s instruction set.  Data randomization is altering how data is stored in 
memory and is a type of low level diversification. 
The model consists of two players, attacker and defender. Defender has to provide service 
with high reliability and performance whereas attacker has to exploit the server. 
Assumption is that service has at least one vulnerability which the attacker knows. They 
consider time te between starting to launch the exploit and system compromise. 
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Considering that instead of the server, the defender generates the key k. If attacker 
determines the key, then it can construct an exploit ak to achieve desired compromise. The 
defense succeeds when all attacker’s exploit is in target class of attack input and attackers 
has not learned enough information about key to exploit ak. The attacker probes the server 
to get information about the key. This increases over time and the attacker learns more 
about the target service. At some point the attacker is able to break in the system. If 
dynamic diversity is applied, then service now has new key for every period and hence the 
attack is disrupted. The goal is to understand what type of diversity can be disrupted with 
such strategy. 
Effectiveness of the moving target defense depends on the attacker’s capabilities, resources 
and strategy. One of them is circumvention attacks, where if the attacker finds any exploit 
that does not depend on the properties that could have been altered by diversification. 
Return to libc attack, incomplete randomization are common examples. In Deputy attacks, 
confused deputy attack attacker finds a benign program in a malicious way. Example of 
this attack is partial overwrite attack that modifies the least significant byte of an address 
to the program’s control is transferred to a targeted function. Dynamic diversity does not 
provide any advantage for deputy attacks, as the attacker is exploiting actual 
transformation. Brute force attacks in attempting all the randomization keys until an exploit 
is found. In Entropy reduction attacked like a NOP sled, which is used in buffer overflow 
are used to overcome uncertainty in the program. Dynamic diversity has modest benefit 
against a brute force or entropy reduction attack, as the maximum impact on the attacker is 
changing the random search with replacement.  A javascript head spraying attack is where 
an attacker uses Javascript code executed by browser to allocate large number of objects 
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in a heap each of which includes NOP sled in order to increase the likelihood that a jump 
to a randomized address will reach one of the copies in memory of the exploit code. 
Probing attack attempts overcomes diversity defense by using probe packets. There are 
designed only for obtaining information about the target, rather than produce malicious 
behavior. Buffer overflow attacks expose randomized addresses in memory and takes 
advantage of the strncpy library functions. Dynamic diversity could be useful in case of 
probe attacks if the time between the probe and exploit is long. Frequent re-randomization 
can be expensive but can be done in some scenarios. Incremental attacks are form of 
probing attacks where more than one successful probe is required to obtain sufficient 
information to construct the exploit. Dynamic diversity is most promising against 
incremental attacks since attacker prepares itself with information before randomization. 
To improve effectiveness of diversity defenses, two approaches can be used, the first is 
composition that will increase the value if re-randomisation and the second is for attacker 
to simultaneously compromise multiple variants. 
R. Zhuang, S. Zhang, A. Bardas, S. A. DeLoach, X. Ou and A. Singhal, “Investigating the 
application of moving target defenses to network security”[6] show Logical Mission Model 
to capture abstract view of the physical network. The driver is the Adaption Engine that 
orders random adaptions to the network at random intervals. These adaptions are 
implemented by Configuration Manager which controls of configuration of Physical 
network. In addition we have Analysis engine that takes real time events from the physical 
network, current configuration from the Configuration Manager. Logical security model 
captures network state along with security state. Goal is to capture system’s security goals 
while capturing vulnerability using a novel method called Conservative Attack Graph. 
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Resource mapping system is implemented as a system communication enforcement 
component. It interacts with configuration manager and pushes the up to date location 
information of the various resources to corresponding RMS. Assumption is that each 
mission critical role is executed on a unique virtual machine. Limitation is when the 
attackers compromises a critical role or a VM.  In this case roles (network services) with 
which compromised role initiates communications can be easily located and attacked. 
Attacker must follow exact communication pattern defined by the Logical Mission Model.  
Adaptive Engine objective is to produce effective configuration that are significantly 
different in costs of adaption or maximizing the entropy. They should be functionally 
correct and consistent. Using intelligent adaptions with randomization allows MTD to 
effectively mitigate unpredicted attacks as well as mask the actions of the control systems. 
Since the Engine is the main decision making component of MTD , It should be able to 
control IP addresses, resources , firewalls between services. 
Analysis engine proposes a conservative attack graph that reduces size of the state model. 
Topology of the graph is partially derived from logical mission model. In normal 
operations users login through authorizer node and interact with planner node. CAG 
captures these logical path and can be now viewed as a state transition system describing 
activities involved to move from one state to the next.  
The paper quantifies impact of MTD systems on computer networks. End goal is to develop 
objective models to predict the effectiveness. Cost of the MTD system, the detectors, 
overhead of adapting the system and real time data collection is a major issue. Design of 
the RMS system is also an major issue where it has made several assumptions. Future work 
is to build the system using open stack and work on the major issues as described before. 
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Jia, Quan, Kun Sun, and Angelos Stavrou. “Motag: Moving target defense against internet 
denial of service attacks.” [7] Computer Communications and Networks 
This paper attempts to solve the problem of distributed denial of service attack by 
proposing MOTAG, Moving Target Defense against Internet Denial of Service Attacks. It 
offers resilience for authorized and authenticated clients of security sensitive services such 
as online banking. It employs a layer of secret moving proxies as a medium for all 
communications between client and servers. The network level filters only allow traffic to 
valid proxy intermediate nodes to reach the server.  
Proxy nodes in MOTAG have two characteristic, one that they are secret, their IP address 
are not disclosed to public. Second they are moving, if an active proxy is attacked it is 
replaced by another node at different location. These help in mitigating brute force attacks 
and allow us to discover malicious insiders and isolate them.  This is done by shuffling 
client assignment to new proxy nodes. The proposed algorithm accurately estimates 
number of insiders, and adjust the assignment accordingly.  
 The solution does not rely on global adoption of Internet routes nor depends on resource 
abundant overlay network and hence avoiding bandwidth attacks and fault tolerance. This 
is taken care by the secret proxies and thereby reducing the costs of deployment while 
offering DDOS protection. 
The proposed system only target security sensitive online services against network flooding 
attacks. General purpose web services are not considered here. Assumption is to have a 
large pool of backup proxies that attacker is not capable of attacking together at once. High 
bandwidth attackers are assumed that are capable of simultaneously overloading multiple 
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machines. If attacker is aware of MOTAG mechanism then they can flood the 
authentication channel hence blocking legitimate clients. 
MOTAG uses DNS registration for associating application domain name with IP address. 
Application servers maintain a dedicated interface with proxies to signal in case of attack. 
For communication capability token is used and for a session, proxy should receive same 
capability token from both parties in communication. Proxy and application communicate 
via a light weighted authenticator that can be dynamically altered. 
If one proxy node is attacked, it will be shut down and a new proxy node will be activated 
as a replacement. This is fast light weighted operation are proxies are simple traffic 
indirection logic and stores no client state. All clients are reassigned. Session information 
are stored on application servers. Client reallocation is done via client to proxy shuffling. 
Authentication server assures accessibility to the moving target defense. Every client has 
to pass the authentication before being assigned to a proxy. As authentication server is 
publicly addressed it can be target of distributed flood attacks. Proof of work approach are 
suitable for protecting client authentication in packets that are infrequently sent to server.  
Proxies are divided into shuffling proxy and serving proxies. When attack shuffling proxies 
will be replaced and associated clients are flushed and reassigned. Algorithm used is greedy 
shuffling algorithms that is recursively called to assign clients to proxies. In security 
analysis it has been proved that the designed approach MOTAG is invulnerable to scanning 
attacks (brute force). Malicious insider can pose a serious threat and MOTAG can have 
these insiders quarantined in few rounds. It also provides resistance to compromised 
proxies using light weight authenticators to verify proxy to server traffic. The approach 
produces two aspect of overheads, i.e. proxy based communication indirection and client 
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to proxy shuffling. Nevertheless the framework can protect DDOS attacks by using hidden 
proxies. 
Han, Yujuan, Wenlian Lu, and Shouhuai Xu. “Characterizing the power of moving target 
defense via cyber epidemic dynamics.”[8] 
The paper studies how to characterize the power of moving target defense in cyber 
epidemic dynamics. The paper defines two novel approach that are applicable when using 
MTD to achieve certain defense goal. The first one is to obtain maximum portion of time 
the system can afford to stay in an insecure configuration, without considering the cost of 
deploying the MTD. The second is minimum cost when system can stay in insecure 
configuration for a predetermined time. Cyber epidemic dynamic models use graph 
theoretic abstraction to represent attack-defense structure and use parameters to represent 
attack and defense capabilities.  
Network based MTD technique: The basic idea is to dynamically regulate which network 
address space can access the services of other address space. By randomizing IP address 
we can defend machine against direct attacks to target computers. 
Hosts based MTD technique:  Instruction level randomization: This aims to randomize 
instruction of each process so that attacker cannot inject malicious code. Code level 
randomization: It offers defense against code reuse attacks by substituting instructions, 
inserting NOPs and reallocating registers. ASLR defends against code injection attacks by 
randomization of memory layout of a program. Application level randomization: N version 
programming that protects dynamically using different implementation of same function. 
Cryptography can avoid this single point of failure because the key has been split in t pieces 
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that will not cause exposure of keys. Proactive cryptography can render compromised 
pieces of key as useless even if reconstructed.  
Instrument based MTD technique: Here honeypot like technique can be used to capture 
new attacks.  Defender can dynamically change the IP address monitored by honeypots.  
 There exists as an attacker, victim relation that can be depicted by a graph called attack-
defense structures. MTD provides proactive defense. The approach in the paper offers 
algorithms for deploying MTD where time that the system can afford to stay in undesired 
configuration can be maximized and the cost of launching MTD can be minimized. The 
study assumes that the attacker defense structure with parameters. It gives no information 
how these parameters are obtained.  The paper also does not allow attacker to choose when 
to use specified configuration as in the real world it is important to give attacker to give 
choice of configuration.  
Hong, Jin B., and Dong Seong Kim. “Scalable security models for assessing effectiveness 
of moving target defenses.” [9] 
In this paper the authors incorporate MTD technique in security modeling using 
Hierarchical Attack Representation Models (HARMs). They classify the moving target 
defense techniques into three major categories, shuffle (rearrange system setting at various 
levels), diversity (provide equivalent functions but different implementation) and 
redundancy (Multiple replica of services or nodes to make multiples of same data). Their 
idea is to use attack representation model (ARM) for assessing effectiveness of MTD 
techniques. Number of path increases exponentially in ARMs as the number of nodes grow. 
To address this problem a hierarchical attack representational model is used for security 
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analysis. It is more scalable than attack graphs and can adopt any ARMs in its layers. It is 
adaptable to single layer changes in networked systems. 
The contributions of the paper are to “Incorporating and analyzing the effectiveness of the 
MTD techniques using the HARM, Applying the MTD techniques to secure attack paths, 
using the Ims to deploy the MTD techniques in scalable and effective manners.”. The paper 
also discusses the modelling methods for incorporating the MTD techniques in HARM.  
Assumption: Even a fixed system can have changes in ARM by various reasons such as 
changes in topology system updates and patching of vulnerabilities.  Attacker exploits 
vulnerabilities of OS. Components can be changed frequently. The authors build the system 
on these constraints using virtual machines.  
Security analysis of MTD techniques is mostly through deployment of the methods to weak 
points and capturing possible changes to the network. To incorporate shuffling method, a 
live virtual machine migration is performed.  It is proved in results that it take O(N) time 
complexity to update changes using HARM. To incorporate diversity, for a VM they apply 
diversity on OS layer and have an attack tree on lower layer .Diversity changes attack 
surface by forcing the attacker to use different exploits. 
The authors validate the models of deploying MTD using a real system, considering 
vulnerable vulnerabilities and then evaluation of MTD techniques with various security 
metrics. Lastly they also provide optimization of important measures with respect to MTD 
techniques.   
Debroy, Saptarshi, et al. “Frequency-Minimal Moving Target Defense using Software-
Defined Networking.”[10] 
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The paper proposes a novel approach “frequency minimization and consequent location 
selection of target movement across heterogeneous virtual machines based on attack 
probability, which in turn minimizes cloud management overheads.”[10] It tends to solve 
the MTD protection design issues with SDN enabled platform.  The proposed system 
allows dual mode operation, proactive migration of target application and reactive 
migration in loss of availability (LOA) attack. This is achieved by frequency minimization 
and location selection of target movement across heterogeneous virtual machines.  
To implement the approach, the authors compare attack probability and migration interval 
selection for different cost budget. If the attacker has high budget for attack, the migration 
will be more frequent and probability will be low. To counter the LOA attacks the paper 
computes a candidate depending upon storage capacity, network bandwidth and attack 
history. Once the target is migrated to new VM all the users are redirected to chosen 
destination VM using Openflow.  
The scheme is evaluated over GENI infrastructure. The feature JUST IN TIME news feed 
application provides unique target usecase with cloud service. The strategy is compared to 
static schemes to prove increase in optimism. System model consists of Openflow 
controller and VMs.  Optimal migration frequency will be such that its is not too infrequent 
to make system vulnerable to cyber-attacks and under this predicate optimization problem 
is mathematically formulated. The paper successfully proves performance benefit 
migration process and performs tradeoff between cost of migration and benefits of 
protection. They however are not able to provide a plan for minimization of cloud cost of 
MTD based solution. 
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Vadlamudi, Satya Gautam, et al. “Moving Target Defense for Web Applications using 
Bayesian Stackelberg Games.” arXiv preprint arXiv:1602.07024 (2016). [11] 
This paper presents a way to find effective switching strategies by modeling system using 
Bayesian Stackelberg games. The administrator is the leader and the hackers are followers. 
Security risks in web applications are major threat today. The moving target based 
approach configures and shifts systems over time to increase uncertainty for the attacker. 
As per concept of MTD, the window of attack opportunities decreases, the cost of attack 
increases. There is uncertainty about the type of attacker and the author captures it as a 
Bayesian game where each of the agents in the game are of multiple types with respective 
probabilities. This is a novel approach that maps moving target defense as a Bayesian 
Stackelberg game. 
 
Figure 1 : A modern web application structure and its components [11] 
 
If any layer in the architecture is compromised the system becomes unworthy. The attack 
can be on presentation layer on server end or malicious java script code leading to XSS 
vulnerability. Moving target defense will not remove the vulnerability but limit the 
exposure of vulnerabilities. One of the example of possible movement is that in storage 
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layer, running and synchronizing multiple database instances having different 
implementation.  
“A Stackelberg game consists of a leader who commits to a strategy _rst, and then a 
follower adopts a strategy which maximizes its own reward based on the leader’s strategy. 
Here the leader has an advantage because she gets to make the first move (choose a strategy 
and commit)”[10]Defender in MTD is of a single type, attacker is of multiple types 
consistent with formulation of Bayesian Stackelberg game. Reward value for both attacker 
and defender are dependent on scenario. 
The attacker type is dependent on following criteria: 
• Difficulty of carrying out action/attack 
• Popularity of target technology  
• Effect of action/attack on target website 
• If attacker leads to detection of attacker which depends on defender and attacker 
type.  
To solve the game the objective is to find mixed strategy which maximizes reward for 
defender considering strategies of the followers. Only reward maximizing pure strategies 
for follower are considered for a given mixed strategy of the leader. There exists an optimal 
strategy for follower that is pure. The paper also shows a working example by assigning 
reward values to both leaders and follower. They consider two major problems, first is to 
find most critical vulnerability and second is to find most sensitive attacker types. 
Once the defender chooses a mixed strategy, next it spends time on finding vulnerabilities 
and updating tables and strategies. When a vulnerability corresponding to an attack is fixed 
with the defender, the corresponding attacks will no longer be considered. New values are 
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to be calculated and compared. The removal of a vulnerability resulting in highest optimal 
reward for the defender can be the most critical vulnerabilities. 
 If the defender does not know the probability with which an attacker might attack the 
system. In such cases, it is important to analyze the accuracy of the table values. Overall 
rewards are to be recalculated using the game equation. The defender can make effort to 
obtain the probability values corresponding to sensitive attackers respectively. 
Experimental results show that BSG strategy is optimal in nature to perform at least as 
good as uniform mixed strategy. The authors succeed in providing effective methodology 
to map moving target defense problem as a Bayesian Stackelberg game to obtain an optimal 
mixed strategy and hence maximizing rewards for the defender. They also provide 
techniques to identify most critical vulnerabilities and most sensitive attacker types to 
improve security that help in improving security of the web.  
Most of the papers surveyed here give emphasis on research on higher levels of local 
autonomy and control to our defensive systems, possibly with different control and 
coordination interfaces. Dynamic diversity is an effective strategy for attacks involving 
extended sequence of requests. Adaption Engine to produce effective configurations that 
can be used in conjunction with random adaptions to mitigate the attacks. The major 
concerns common to all the papers is to combat costs for diversification, real time data 
collections and design of new subsystems. Few papers articulate novel algorithm to 
optimizatise the system and tradeoffs between cost of migration and benefits of protection. 
One of the interesting approach is to apply game theory approach to make more informed 
decision to tackle web security problem. 
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Live Migration 
 
By definition, Live migration refers to the process of moving a running virtual machine or 
application between different physical machines without disconnecting the client or 
application. Memory, storage, and network connectivity of the virtual machine are 
transferred from the original guest machine to the destination.[12] 
One of the most important applications of Live migration is proactive maintenance. Aside 
from this, it is used for load balancing. Live migration for moving target defense under the 
dynamic network category. As VMs are migration between machines, the information with 
attacker, about the IP and the ports are now stale.  
There are two kinds of live migration with respect to virtual machines.  
Pre-Copy Migration: Memory is copied before migration. 
• Warm Up Phase – Hypervisor typically copies all the memory pages from source 
to destination while the VM is still running on the source. If some memory pages
’ change (become ‘dirty’) during this process, they will be re-copied until the 
rate of re-copied pages is not less than page dirtying rate. 
• Stop and Copy – VM will be stopped on the original host. The remaining dirty 
pages will be copied to the destination.VM will be resumed on the destination host. 
If the destination fails during migration, pre-copy can recover the VM. Pre-copy retains an 
up-to-date state of the VM at the source during migration. 
Post-Copy Migration: Source is suspended first and then the memory is copied.  
• Source VM suspend – Post-copy VM migration is initiated by suspending the VM 
at the source. A minimal subset of the execution state of the VM (CPU state, 
registers and, optionally, non-page able memory) is transferred to the target. 
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• Pre-paging and Copy – The VM is then resumed at the target. source actively 
pushes the remaining memory pages of the VM to the target – an activity known 
as pre-paging. 
In Post-copy, the VM’s state is distributed over both source and destination. At the target, 
if the VM tries to access a page that has not yet been transferred, it generates a page-fault. 
Too many network faults can degrade performance of applications running inside the VM. 
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CHAPTER 2 
ATTACK DETECTION 
Setup 
I setup centralized syslog server for 6 hosts (1 Windows 7 VM, 1 Fedora 23 VM, 1 CentOS 
6.5 VM, 1 Kali Linux 2.0 VM, 1 Metasploitable 2.0 VM, 1 Ubuntu 16.04 VM) in a 
Openstack based cloud networking environment.  For this I used thoth lab, as it is easy to 
spin up any desired topology in it.  The system details are as shown in the Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 – System Detail 
 
This topology is as shown in the Figure 3.  
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Figure 3 – Topology of the log collection system 
 
RSYSLOG is the rocket-fast system for log processing [13]. It offers high-performance, 
great security features and a modular design. While it started as a regular syslogd, rsyslog 
has evolved into a kind of swiss army knife of logging, being able to accept inputs from a 
wide variety of sources, transform them, and output to the results to diverse destinations. 
In the topology of the Figure 1, the Ubuntu-VM is the centralized log server and rest of the 
machines are configured to send logs to it. This configuration is made in the rsyslog.conf 
file in /etc/ of the machines.  
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Table 2 – At Ubuntu-VM server 
/etc/rsyslog.conf 
# provides UDP syslog reception 
#$ModLoad imudp 
#$UDPServerRun 514 
 
# provides TCP syslog reception 
$ModLoad imtcp 
$InputTCPServerRun 514 
 
 
I am using TCP for log collection as I do not want to lose out on any logs.  This is shown 
in Table 2.On the client side , I will enable the machine to send logs to the Ubuntu-VM. 
Configuration to add it in mysql was also added and further connected to Log Analyzer for 
visualization. This has not been included in the thesis as it does not contribute to the parsing 
and reduction of logs. 
Table 2 shows example of the Ubuntu client sending logs.  
Table 3- At Ubuntu Client 
/etc/rsyslog.d/50-default.conf 
*.*                       @192.168.5.4:514 
 
 
After setting up all the client machines as shown in Table 3, rsyslog server is restarted, so 
that the configuration changes are included. I could see the logs being collected 
immediately.  
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Log Collection and Analysis 
The logs collected in the Ubuntu-VM are in directories with their host name. This helps in 
differentiating in host wise log. The format of the log is as given in the Table 4. 
Table 4 - Rsyslog-LogFormat 
RSYSLOG_TraditionalFileFormat 
"%TIMESTAMP% %HOSTNAME% %syslogtag%%msg:::sp-if-no-1st-
sp%%msg:::drop-last-lf%\n\" 
May  8 18:30:11 Ubuntu-Client sudo:     root : TTY=pts/11 ; 
PWD=/home/sammy/ftp/files ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/usr/bin/nmap -sV 
192.168.4.10 
 
Creating list of normal activates was a challenge as it required complete understanding of 
the system. I made a list of applications that are run on the system and categorized them as 
normal. This is called as audit policy. 
 For E.g. Every system has a defined number of CRON jobs. If the logs in the Cron.log 
show addition of new cron jobs or logs from a non-defined cron job, it shows abnormality.  
On collection of logs, the parser extracts Date, Hostname, Appname , HostIP and messages 
from each line of the logs. This is converted into csv as a data set.  
The audit policy for the logs identifies the threat vs non threat for each log and also assign 
value to the feature source, to identify if the logs are generated from the system or 
applications. The classification of logs if threat or not ,is done by the pre defined audit 
   25
policy. This is based on the knowledge of the network hosts and its system. Few of the 
conditions that are considered non threatful are as follows :  
• If the logs can generated from the pre defined cron jobs, they are marked safe. 
• Logs showing activities from applications that are expected to be on the system 
• Traffic showing pam_unix from pexec from authorized users is considered as safe.  
• Changes showing useradd, groupadd , change of user id ,s sudo and root operations 
are marked as potential threats. 
• Any unexpected process restarts, package download and user creation is marked as 
threat. 
• Unexpected applications and their logs are considered threats, like rlogin , rsh and 
rexec, segfaults. 
• Kernel level logs for known behavior as marked as non-threats.  
The goal is to perform activates that attacker will be to perform the malicious activities in 
a way to evade normal signature based detection agents like Snort. Table-5 shows list of 
logs that were collected.  
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Table 5 - Types of Logs Collected 
S.No. Log File Name Description 
1 CRON.log Cron job logs which are scheduled to automate 
repetitive tasks 
2 NetworkManager.log Logs activities of network manager daemon which 
provides detection and configuration for systems to 
connect automatically to network 
3 Root.log / su.log Activities performed by root user 
4 sudo.log Activities performed by users that are also sudoers 
5 Rsyslog  Standard event logging from the host activities 
configured by rsyslog utility   
6 Groupadd.log Logs activities when group of user changes  
7 rlogin.log Captures rlogin service activities 
8 Rsh.log and 
rexec.log 
Captures non interactive programs run on remote 
server using rsh  
9 gnome-session.log Captures activities from gnome -desktop environment 
10 kernel.log Has up to date errors and status updates while booted in 
operating system. 
11 dhclient.log Logs messages from dhclient 
12 systemd.log Logs all systemd actions  
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The procedure followed to create the dataset is shown in the Table 6 
Table 6 - Procedure to create dataset 
Creating Dataset 
Input : Rsyslog Directories from Central Log server 
Output : CSV file with features 
noiseList : List of log attributes that can be eliminated from the dataset 
SourceMap : Maps appname to System or Application 
while !EndofLogfiles do 
         Spilt log lines to extract attributes from Log line 
         if(attributes) do not match noiseList 
CSV.add(attributes)  
         end if 
end while 
for all attribute in CSV file 
         if attribute{appname} in SourceMap 
                     CSV.append{attribute}(Source=SourceMap(attribute.appname)) 
         end if 
end for 
for all attribute in CSV file 
         Input the value for threat value in Boolean T/F 
end for 
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Results 
  
Once the logs are filtered as threatful and non threatful, all the threatful logs are combined 
together. The time stamp field is converted into EPOCH time and all logs are sorted 
according to the time. This gives us the complete picture of the connections made by the 
systems to one another in a time line. This can be a ground for detection of attack. This 
approach can be used as a starting step to detect attacks like Advanced Persistent Attacks 
that are designed to pass the detection of Network Intrusion System like Snort. 
The Table 7 shows subset of events that form time line of abnormal activities.  
 
Table 7 - Sample filtered log lines of threatful events 
 
Epoch Time Source IP Service Destination IP 
1494289681 192.168.4.11 sudo 192.168.4.8 
1494293780 192.168.4.11 vsftpd 192.168.4.11 
1494294548 192.168.4.11 sudo 192.168.4.8 
1494304744 192.168.4.8 rlogind 192.168.4.11 
1494304793 192.168.4.8 rshd 192.168.4.11 
1494304812 192.168.4.8 rlogind 192.168.4.11 
1494304901 192.168.4.8 rshd 192.168.4.11 
1494305111 192.168.4.8 rlogind 192.168.4.11 
1494305196 192.168.4.8 rlogind 192.168.4.11 
1494305756 192.168.4.8 rshd 192.168.4.11 
1494305787 192.168.4.8 rshd 192.168.4.11 
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In the above table only source IP and destination IP, service and epoch time are included. 
The message field is truncated in this example.  
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CHAPTER 4 
DOCKER MIGRATION  
Setup 
I set up a topology of 4 system in Thoth lab [15]. All four system has same configuration.  
The detailed configuration of the machines is show in the Figure 4 
 
Figure 4 - Configuration of Machines for Live Migration 
 
The VM 1 is source machine, where the containers are running. VM 3 is machine that I 
consider as destination. This machine is where I will transfer my container state. It has 
same configuration as VM 1. VM 4 is machine which acts as external client to test 
connections to internal VM1 and VM3. The VM1 and VM3 form a DMZ and can be 
accessed on through VM2- Big. This machine has Apache2 installed that allows it to 
become proxy for internal machines. Figure 5 shows the topology.  
On VM1 and VM3, I have installed Docker 1.13 CE edition along with experimental flag 
turned on. This is a mandatory step as it allows live migration [13]. It can be enabled by 
editing the docker.conf file like below: 
# cat /etc/systemd/system/docker.service.d/docker.conf  
[Service] 
ExecStart= 
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ExecStart=/usr/bin/dockerd -H fd:// --experimental=true 
After that the docker details will look like below  
#docker version 
Server: 
 Version:      1.13.0 
 API version:  1.25 (minimum version 1.12) 
 Go version:   go1.7.3 
 Git commit:   49bf474 
 Built:        Tue Jan 17 09:50:17 2017 
 OS/Arch:      linux/amd64 
 Experimental: true 
 
Figure 5 - Toplogy for live migration 
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I restart the docker service to make sure all changes are reflected.  
Another important tool is CRIU (Check point restore). I built it using the source from 
github (https://github.com/xemul/criu). It has several dependencies and there are to be 
present before the source is installed (make, make install). They are: libnet1-dev git build-
essential libprotobuf-dev libprotobuf-c0-dev protobuf-c-compiler protobuf-compiler 
python-protobuf libnl-3-dev libpth-dev pkg-config libcap-dev asciidoc.  
To check if CRIU has been installed properly, the CRIU check command should return the 
following output.  
# criu check 
Warn  (criu/autofs.c:79): Failed to find pipe_ino option (old kernel?) 
Looks good. 
On VM 2 – Big, Apache2 is used as a proxy. The initial rewrite rule in 000-default.conf is 
that all traffic is transferred to VM1. On migration, from VM1 itself , automatically the 
rewrite rule will  be change to point all traffic to VM3.  
I established a passwordless SSH between VM1 – VM3 and VM1 – VM2 for live migration 
and IP redirection. 
In order to establish that the Hardware and Operating system of the system is not affected 
by the attacker, a Hardware/Operating system trust system can be used to ensure 
authenticity. This will ensure the kernel level security and the solution proposed in the 
thesis is used for application level security. 
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Methodology  
 
I take a sample container from docker hub called tutum/apache-php [16]. It is a Base docker 
image to run PHP applications on Apache.  To run this docker container I use the following 
command on VM1 
#docker run –name = test  -d -p 80:80 tutum/apache-php 
Now a http apache server has started running on port 80. This can be confirmed by 
accessing http://localhost from the browser on VM1.  
Before adding the checkpoint, the commit of docker container is required.  
#docker commit test  
The next step is to add a check point. The checkpoint directory I use is /tmp/ for simplicity. 
Any custom path can be given. Basically, it will store all the images of the state in this 
folder. This is done via running command like below  
#docker checkpoint create test cr1 --checkpoint-dir=/tmp/  
Now that a check point is created, the next step is to transfer the cr1 state information to 
VM3. I am using secure copy and the secure copy is automated using passwordless ssh. 
#scp –r /tmp/cr1 192.168.1.6:/tmp/ 
Now we have the state information on the VM3. Before we resume the container state on 
VM3, there is a additional step that has to be performed. I do this in the setup. I create the 
same image of apache-php on VM3 and keep it in checkpoint ready state. The reason to 
this is to save time in creating new image on the go and also to have a same root file system 
for the container.  
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Once the VM3, is in checkpoint restore ready state , I use the below command to restore 
the container.  This command is run from VM1 to VM3  
#ssh 192.168.1.6 ‘docker start –checkpoint cr1 test –checkpoint-dir=/tmp/’ 
The next step is to change the ipaddress redirection to move the traffic from VM1 to VM3. 
This change is done from VM1 itself.  I use the following command to change the ip-
redirection  
ssh 192.168.1.2 ‘| sudo -S sed -i "s/RewriteRule \/\.\* http\:\/\/192\.168\.1\.5\/ 
\[R\]/RewriteRule \/\.\* http:\/\/192\.168\.1\.6\/ \[R\]/g"' /etc/apache2/sites-enabled/000-
default.conf 
The time between docker commit to IP redirection together is the downtime of the 
application in the docker.  I will evaluate the down time in the next section. 
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Performance Evaluation  
 
I evaluated the performance of the container migration by using the previously mentioned 
apache-php image. The experiment was performed 10 times for every 1000 request and 
trend was plotted on the average of these experiment. The graphs in this section show 
timing for each of the steps in migration and the traffic.  
Number of requests vs Time to commit (seconds): 
 
Figure 6 - Number of Requests Vs Time to Commit 
 
Average time to commit is 0.53 seconds 
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Number of requests vs Time to checkpoint (seconds): 
 
Figure 7 - Number of Requests Vs Time to Checkpoint 
 
Average time to check point is 0.59 seconds 
Number of requests vs Time to transfer (seconds) : 
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Figure 8 - Number of Requests Vs Time to Transfer 
 
Average time to transfer the state is 1.69seconds 
Number of requests vs Time to restore(seconds) 
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Figure 9 - Number of Requests Vs Time to Restart 
 
Average time to restore the container is 1.61 seconds.  
The total average time to migrate a container is 4.30 seconds. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this thesis, I was able to trace events for attack detection and also show a proof of concept 
for live migration of docker containers. The average time to migrate the container is 4.30 
seconds for 80mb size of state.  
This can be improved by adding pre-copy type of element like virtual machine migration. 
I am closely following the docker project and I wish to improve the setup as and when 
docker new features are introduced.  
I also want to suggest an extension of event tracing by temporal logic so that it gives a 
differentiation between connection and control. In that way, it can be used to detect 
Advanced Persistent Threats.  
The bigger picture here is that as we moving towards light weight containers, migration 
can definitely an important feature to use.  
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